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PREFACE
South African society offers few opportunities for race relations 
to evolve without the complicating effects of political policies 
and ideology. Race relations in South Africa are ordered within a 
framework of structures which more frequently than not prevent an 
evolution of human interaction from reaching its full potential 
of goodwill and understanding between groups.
There is a need in our society for situations to be observed and 
reported on in which different groups can establish relationships 
without the interference of the structures of social and 
political differentiation which apply in public life generally. 
One situation in which this possibility might have existed was 
the coastal town of Port St Jdhns after the decentralisation of 
power to a government in Umtata, made a non-racial community a 
theoretical possibility.
This modest study is an attempt to study that situation as a case 
study in race relations and the potential for bridging 
inter-group differences in our society. The possibilities were 
not realised in the case of Port St Johns, but hopefully this 
analysis will point to the reasons for that failure and identify 
the potential for a more promising outcome in other situations in 
the future.
(iii)
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CHAPTER 1
THE STUDY AND ITS SETTING : PORT ST JOHNS
The area of Port St Johns at the mouth of the Umzimvubu River 
on the Indian Ocean in the Republic of Transkei* has three 
times in the last century seen the racial composition of its 
governing authority change. At the beginning of settlement in 
the area, it fell under the control of black tribal 
administrations, then from 1884 it was under a white 
administration, and since 1976 it has once again been 
controlled by a black administration.
The aim of this case study, is to report on and analyse how and 
why the white and coloured residents of Port St Johns reacted 
as they did to the most recent change in control of the area* 
from a white administration to a black administration. This 
study was commenced in 1974, shortly after an announcement was 
made proposing that Port St Johns be incorporated into the area 
of Transkei, which at that time was a self-governing black 
administration responsible to the white government of the 
Republic of South Africa. During 1974, a sample of 
approximately ten percent of the white and coloured population 
was interviewed in-depth on a wide range of issues, including 
their reactions to the incorporation issue, their racial views, 
and their fears about being ruled by a black administration.
In 1981-82, a follow-up study was undertaken, in which all the 
remaining white and several members of the coloured comnunity 
were interviewed in-depth on a wide range of issues including 
their reactions to the incorporation issue, their racial views, 
and views on the Transkei, approximately five years after Port 
St Johns had been placed under the control of a black 
Transkeian government. In the analysis of the survey data, 
comparisons were drawn, and references were made to residents' 
attitudes to various key variables, to determine what changes 
had occurred over' this period of time, and the possible 
determinants of these changes.
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The Historical Background
Up until 1844, Port St Johns and its isurroundings had been under 
the control of numerous Mpondo chiefdoms. In 1844, the Governor 
of the Cape Colony, Sir Peregrine Maitland, under pressure from 
local Wesleyan missionaries, signed a treaty with Fáku a Mpondo 
chief in the area. This treaty provided for the recognition of 
Faku as the ruler of the territory between the Mzimkulu and the 
Mthatha rivers and the Khahlamba (Drakensburg) Mountains and the 
ocean. Port St Johns fell into this area. The real purpose in 
creating this treaty state is still a matter of controversy. One 
of the most widely held views amongst historians is that this 
treaty state was created to act as a buffer between Natal, the 
Cape Colony and the Highveld voortrekkers. Thus began a stage of 
indirect limited control of Port St Johns by a white 
administration.
During the early 19th century, white-ruled Natal displayed, in 
the words of Saunders and Derricourt, a spirit of 
"extraordinarily aggressive expansionism. "^There was a desire in 
Natal in the 1840's, to dump so-called "surplus" Africans beyond 
its southern border, and furthermore "the Boers of the Republic 
of Natal had a voracious appetite for land." Partially occupied 
fertile land lay temptingly across Natal's southern border. In 
accordance with Natal's expansionist ambitions and a desire for 
trade routes, the Colonial Government of Natal acquired free 
access from Faku to the Mzimvubu River, and complete control, but 
short of actual possession of the port of Port St Johns. This 
enabled Natal traders in the mid 1860's to sell significant 
quantities of hoes, picks, ploughs and wagons and fire arms to 
the Mpondo which were imported through the port. It also led to 
the exporting of cattle and timber through the port, and resulted 
in an estimated fifty to sixty white traders establishing 
themselves in Pondoland during this time.
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These trading activities brought about an increasing concern 
amongst the colonial authorities as to the extent to which customs 
duties were being avoided through the use of the port, and also 
the volume of arms and ammunition reaching the Mpondo. In order to 
contain these practices, attempts were made by the Cape and Natal 
governments at various stages, to buy Port St Johns from Faku. He 
steadfastly refused.
In the 1860's, tensions began to grow between the "great house" 
and the "right hand house" of Faku's chiefdom. These tensions 
resulted in a split, and one of Faku's sons, Ndamase, founded a 
new chiefdom on the west bank of thé Umzimvumbu River. Faku died 
in 1867 and was succeeded by another son, Mqikela. These two 
chiefs assumed the rights of independent rulers and split the 
Mpondo state. This meant that two leaders had to be dealt with in 
order to gain control of Port St Johns.
The British High Commissioner tried to persuade Mqikela to sell 
the area occupied by him at Port St Johns to the Cape Colonial 
government. Mqikela refused and the High Commissioner then 
negotiated with Nqiliso who had succeeded his father, Ndamase. In 
July of 1878, an agreement was concluded between Nqiliso and the 
colonial authorities, whereby he ceded to the government of the 
Cape Colony, all the sovereign rights which he possessed over the 
water and navigation of the Umzimvubu River, and also a narrow 
strip of land on the western side of the river. In return, Nqiliso 
was paid £1 000 and recognised as an independent chief.
In response to Mqikela's refusal to part with any of his land, the 
British High Commissioner sent troops to Seize a strip of 
territory on the eastern bank of the Umzimvubu River. This land 
was seized by General Thesiger ( Lord Chelmsford) in August 
of 1878, and proclaimed British territory. The Mpondo protested 
vigorously about the seizure of their territory, and in return for 
the loss of this territory, Mqikela was given an annual subsidy of 
£200 as compensation.
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The territory occupied by Port St Johns was finally annexed by 
proclamation to the Cape Colony by the Governor of the Colony, 
under the provisions of Act No 35 of 1884, on 13th September of 
that year. This Act was known as the "Walfish Bay and St John's 
River Territories Annexation Act, 1884". In regard to Port St 
Johns, this Act simply stated that, "it is expedient that the Port 
and Tidal Estuary of the St John's River in South Africa, and 
certain lands on the banks of the said river forming part of Her 
Majesty's Dominions be also annexed to this Colony". It also made 
provision for the application of Colonial Acts and the jurisdiction 
of the courts in the territory.
The remainder of Pondoland was annexed to the Cape Colony in 1894. 
After annexation, the Cape government divided Mpondo territory into 
several magisterial districts in which courts were established and 
taxes levied. This process was accompanied by the diminuition of 
the power of the tribal chiefs, and a white chief magistrate 
ultimately having responsibility for tribal matters.
Thus by the end of the 19th Century, the Mpondo who were the 
original inhabitants of the Port St Johns area, had been 
subordinated to colonial magistrates and white rule. At the time of 
Union in May 1910, Port St johns came under the jurisdiction of a 
powerful white government of the Union of South Africa, and the 
process of consolidating and ensuring further control over local 
hierarchies and their interests continued. ^
The Legislative Background to Incorporation
The legislative foundations for the incorporation of Port St Johns 
and the separation of race groups in South Africa, was laid well 
before the advent of National Party rule in 1948. There are two 
main pieces of legislation passed prior to 1948 which were 
subsequently used by the National Party government to implement 
"independent nation state" policy. When these two pieces of 
legislation were passed, their intention was to provide fora degree
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of territorial segregation in South Africa, but not to provide 
the basis for "independent nation states".
The first important piece of legislation to be passed was the 
Natives Land Act No 27 of 1913. This Act defined certain 
geographic areas which were referred to as "scheduled areas", in 
which blacks could purchase land, and within which people other 
than blacks could not purchase land. This Act made provision for 
the purchase of approximately ten and a half million morgen of 
land for the creation of what were then known as "native 
reserves".
The second important piece of legislation to be passed, was the 
Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. This Act made provision for an 
additional seven and a quarter million morgen of land known as 
"released areas" which were to be added to the "native reserves" 
as provided for in the 1913 Act. The Native Trust and Land Act 
also provided for the establishment of a "South African Native 
Trust" which was empowered to purchase this land for native 
(black) settlement in the "released areas". The Trust could not 
acquire more than 1 616 000 morgen in the Cape Province, in which 
Port St Johns was then situated. In terms of this legislation, 
the area of Port St Johns fell neither in a "scheduled" or 
"released" area.
As can be seen from the two legislative enactments referred to 
above, the policy of successive South African governments prior 
to 1948, was a policy of racial segregation, and more 
particularly racial segregation at the territorial level. With 
the assumption of power by the National Party government in 1948, 
the idea of racial segregation was incorporated into a far 
reaching and rigid ideology. This ideology provided for a policy 
of geopolitical separation or "separate development", and the 
creation of "self-governing homelands" and "independent 
nation-states" for the various black groups of South Africa. 
Transkei was the first "independent nation-state" to be created 
in terms of this policy. The ideology of "separate development" 
has been described by Schrire as being:
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"deceptively simple. The black population of 
the country is conceptualised as being made up of 
ten ethnic communities or nations - each entitled 
to sovereign independence and unassimilable with 
each other and with the white or brown nations.
Each individual black, irrespective of culture, 
birthplace or residence, remains an immutable 
component of one of these ethnic nations. The 
aim of the policy is, in its simplest terms to 
disentangle South Africa's multiracial society 
which past economic and social forces have 
created".
To enable groups to govern themselves in distinct political 
entities in terms of this policy, the members of those groups have 
to be brought together into consolidated geographic entities. The 
town of Port St Johns was affected by this "disentangling process" 
as dictated by National Party ideology. The issue of the 
incorporation of Port St Johns into the surrounding predominantly 
black populated geographic area, was an example of a clash between 
local white interests and National Party ideology, with the 
requirements and consequences of that ideology ultimately 
prevailing.
The first important legislative enactment passed by the National 
Party government to give substance to its "self-governing homeland" 
policy, was the Bantu Authorities Act No 68 of 1951. This Act 
abolished the Native Representative Council, which at that time was 
the only legitimate structure in South Africa in which all the 
blacks of the country were represented. This Act also made 
provision for decentralised institutions of local government, in 
the form of tribal, regional and territorial authorities (Bantu 
Authorities) and signalled a return to a form of tribal government ■*
which existed in the case of the Mpondo before annexation. The 
provisions of this act were applied to certain prescribed areas of 
present day Transkei by Proclamation No 180 of 1956. This 
Proclamation specifically excluded the district of Port St Johns 
from the authority of the newly created "Bantu Authorities".
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In a South African House of Assembly debate which took place
during the passing of this legislation, Dr H F Verwoerd, Minister
of Native Affairs at the time, said that "we should not close our
eyes to the inexorable fact that just as little as we desire to
have black spots in European (white) areas, as little will white
spots be able to remain within native areas. What is just and
fair with regard to the European living in the European area,
51also applies to the native within the area which is his".- It was 
this line of thought which eventually led to the incorporation of 
Port St Johns into the Transkei.
A further important legislative provision was the passing of the 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No 46 of 1959. In terms of 
this Act, indirect black representation in the South African 
parliament was abolished, and eight national units were created 
for the major ethnic groups in South Africa. Transkei was one of 
these envisaged national units. This Act also assigned further 
powers, functions and duties to the regional and territorial 
authorities as provided for in the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951.
The next important legislative enactment concerning the Transkei, 
was the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963. In terms of this Act, 
the previous Transkeian Territorial Authority was replaced by a 
Legislative Assembly headed by a Chief Minister with substantive 
law making powers, and supervisory powers over certain 
governmental departments. This legislation laid the foundations 
for the black government which was to govern the Transkei after 
independence. This legislation in conjunction with other 
legislation provided for the specific exclusion of the white area 
of Port St Johns, from the Transkei Legislative Assembly, as far 
as the exercising of certain defined powers of the Assembly was 
concerned. This Act was followed by Proclamation R336 of December 
1965, and R54 of February 1970, which provided for the 
reservation of thirty smaller Transkeian towns for the black 
citizens of the territory, and also extended the Municipal area of 
Port St Johns to include the white, owned farms surrounding the
1
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town. In terms of these Proclamations, no white non-Transkeian 
citizen could acquire an interest in one of these reserved areas, 
except by inheritance or donation. Port St Johns was excluded from 
these provisions.
Links between Port St Johns and the white South African government 
were further strengthened by the Transkei Constitution Amendment 
Act of 1968, which excluded further powers over the white area of 
Port St Johns from the Transkei Legislative Assembly. The powers 
excluded were the authority over inferior courts, the 
administration of deceased estates, wills, succession, births, 
deaths and marriages in respect of citizens of the Transkei 
domiciled in the white area, and also excluded the jurisdiction of 
the High Court for the Transkei over the area. This Act also made 
the South African Group Areas Act of 1966 applicable to the white 
area of Port St Johns. In 1971, the law was amended to exclude 
Transkei from the payment of Transkei Territories Road Tax. 
Further, in 1973 the Transkei Liquor Proclamation was amended to 
exclude all liquor licences in Port St Johns falling under 
the jurisdiction of the Transkei authorities.
The tendency therefore, over the years was to progressively 
exclude Port St Johns, through legislation from the Transkei 
government, and link it more firmly to the South African 
government. A sudden turn-around in this trend developed between 
1973 and 1976. The reasons and reactions to this turn-around will 
be analysed below.
Geographic, Demographic and some Social Characteristics
The area of Port St Johns which fell under the jurisdiction of the 
South African government until 1976, was approximately 9247 
hectares in extent and lay at the mouth of the Umzimvubu River. 
This area was surrounded to the north, west, and south, by 
territory under the jurisdiction of successive Transkeian 
governmental authorities as referred to above. This enclave had 
limited access to the rest of South Africa in that it had had no 
operational port facilities since about 1942, and had only two 
poor access roads and a small air field.
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An important factor which attracted many of the white people to Port 
St Johns, was the physical beauty, and peace and calm that prevailed 
in the area. This factor resulted in Port St Johns becoming a fairly 
large retirement centre for white pensioners. In 1970, it was 
estimated that there were 483 white, 183 coloured, and 34,488 black 
residents in the area. The whites and coloureds fell under the 
jurisdiction of the South African central governmeht, and the blacks 
fell largely under the jurisdiction of the Transkeian government.
The occupational breakdown as a percentage of the total population 
of white breadwinners in 1974 was as follows
Pensioners 40%
Businessmen 30%
Farmers 20%
Public and private sector employees 
(Post Office, Magistrate's Court,
Police, Municipality, Bank) 10%
The occupational breakdown as a percentage of the total population 
of coloured breadwinners in 1974 was as follows ^  :
Artisans (builders/painters) 42% 
Businessmen/farmers 15% 
Pensioners 14% 
Fishermen 12% 
Municipal employees 10% 
Unclassified (unemployed) 5% 
Teachers 2%
Of the white population, 88 percent were English speaking, and 12 
percent Afrikaans speaking. The entire coloured population was 
English speaking.
Approximately 42 percent of the white population had been born 
within the boundaries of the Transkei, 45 percent had been born in 
South Africa, and the remaining 13 percent had been born beyond the 
borders of South Africa. Of the white residents of Port St Johns in 
1974, 24 percent had previously traded in other parts of the Transkei.
All members of the coloured population group had been born in the 
9)Transkei. '
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According to the 1971-1972 Municipal Voter's Roll, Port St Johns 
had 219 white and 7 coloured property owners. The market value of 
their properties was estimated in 1974 by the Municipal Council, 
the Ratepayers' Association, and the Fanners' Association at 
R15 million.As can be seen from the statistics above, a high 
proportion of the white population were pensioners, and therefore 
no less than sixty years of age.
The people who had previously traded in various parts of the 
Transkei, had sold their properties to the "Bantu Trust" in terms 
of South African government policy, and had moved to Port St Johns 
on the basis of assurances given to them which will be referred to 
below. Most of the people who had retired to Port St Johns, had 
invested all their savings in their properties with the intention of 
remaining there permanently.
In 1974, the white political party preferences as a percentage of 
the population were as follows ^  :
United Party 40% 
National Party 15% 
Progressive Party 13% 
Democratic Party/Doubtful 24%
The coloured population tended to support the Labour Party, and had 
a great deal of sympathy for the Progressive Party.
As far as the local economy of Port St Johns was concerned, it was 
heavily dependent upon tourism and white capital brought in by old 
and new residents. On average, approximately 12 000 tourists 
visited Port St Johns annually, with about 6 000 visiting Port St 
Johns over the Christmas period (11). The Municipality of Port St 
Johns derived a fair amount of its income from the holiday camps 
that it operated. Also many of the traders and small scale farmers 
were heavily dependent upon this annual influx of visitors for 
their livelihoods.
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Most of the white population employed black domestic workers, and 
this resulted in a certain amount of income for the local 
population, which in turn helped the white traders. As pointed 
out above, 42 percent of the coloured breadwinners were artisans, 
and most of their work was undertaken for the white property 
owners. This illustrates the key role of whites in the Port St 
Johns econonty at the time. The white property owners and the 
tourists sustained local businesses, tradesmen and farmers, with 
the coloured artisan group servicing both the property owners and 
the businesses. All this generated a need for lesis-skilled black 
employment, which in turn provided a market for white 
shopkeepers. The groups in the Port St Johns economy were highly 
interdependent.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCORPORATION INTO A BLACK STATE
White Concerns about the Future Control of Port St Johns
From the mid 1950's, the whites of Port St Johns had expressed 
concern as to the future control of the area. Behind this concern 
was a fear of what the consequences of rule by a black government 
would be for white interests in the area. This fear was aroused 
by statements of policy made by the National Party government, 
and Dr Vërwoerd in particular, as regards the future of "white 
spots" in "black areas". An example of this is the policy 
statement made by Dr Verwoerd during the debate on the passing of 
the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 as referred to above.
Port St Johns was somewhat different from other "white spots" in 
that it had a sizeable and concentrated white population relative 
to other "white spots" in other rural areas of the Transkei. 
Another factor distinguishing Port St Johns from other "white 
spots" was that by virtue of its coastal location it was not 
completely surrounded by "black territory" in order to be defined 
as a "white spot" in terms of the relevant legislation. Finally, 
unlike other "white spots", it was believed by some whites that 
Port St Johns had been bought from the Mpondo.
Because Port St Johns was different from other "white spots", the 
whites in the area were somewhat reassured that the area would 
not be incorporated into the Transkei and placed under black 
government control. Also because of the fairly large vested 
interests that the whites had in the area, it was perhaps 
unlikely that the South African government would find it 
financially or politically feasible to include the area in the 
Transkei. However, the whites were never completely reassured 
that the area would not be placed under black government control.
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This uncertainty led to the Port St Johns Farmers' Association 
seeking the first of several written assurances from the South 
African government and the then Minister of Native Affairs, Dr H F 
Verwoerd. Communicating through a Magistrate, Dr Verwoerd stated in 
1955 that,
"the Port St Johns European area is not a white spot as is 
generally understood by the term by reason of the fact 
that it is a European harbour with a European
neighbourhood and with free access to other European areas 
by means of the open sea route, thus excluding the 
necessity to pass through native reserves. Port St Johns 
European area must therefore still be regarded as an 
ordinary European area by reason of its special location. 
In view of the Minister's decision, I have been directed 
to assure you that the South African Native Trust is not 
interested in acquiring any of the land or other sites 
forming part of Port St Johns' area and that there is no 
intention to acquire this area by purchase or otherwise 
for native settlement" (Letter dated 10/11/55.)
A further assurance was received from the Department of Bantu 
Administration in 1961, by the Port St Johns' Farmers' Association. 
This letter stated that,
"Your Association is no doubt under the mistaken 
impression that Port St Johns and the European area
adjoining it are what is known as a 'white spot'. This
term is, however used to describe land which is entirely
surrounded by native areas. Some of the villages in the 
Transkeian territory and other parts of the country, are 
such 'white spots', but Port St Johns is not one of them. 
The Honourable the Minister wishes to remind the
Association that both he and his predecessor in office (Dr 
Verwoerd) have given assurances that the South African 
Native Trust has no interest in acquiring properties in
the area, and the government will not allow any Bantu to
( 1 2 )purchase any property there." '
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This statement received extensive press coverage, and is believed 
to have influenced several whites to settle in the area.
In 1962, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development 
again gave his assurance that "neither the town of Port St Johns, 
nor the European area adjoining it, will at any time fall in the 
area of jurisdiction of the proposed Transkeian government. The 
position of Port St Johns and its future is therefore not 
different to any other town in the Republic which is not entirely 
surrounded by a Bantu area."
The white residents of Port St Johns were still not satisfied with 
these assurances, and requested the Minister concerned to 
introduce legislation to ensure that the area would remain 
"white". The Minister replied that legislation was not necessary 
because Port St Johns was a "white" area in terms of existing 
legislation.
A further assurance was sought and received by the Port St Johns' 
Farmers' Association in 1970, from the Secretary to the Minister 
of Bantu Administration and Development. In this letter it was 
stated that "the policy of the government with regard to Port St 
Johns, has in the past been stated in the clearest of terms. The 
Honourable the Minister wishes to re-iterate that the white area 
of Port St Johns will never form part of the Bantu governmental 
area of the Transkei." (Letter dated 25/8/1970.) No further 
assurances were sought by the residents of Port St Johns after 
receiving this letter.
The Black View
From the early 1970's, the policy of the National Party of 
creating an "independent homeland" of Transkei began to gather an 
internal momentum amongst certain blacks of the territory. The 
black attitude surrounding the "independence" of the Transkei, was 
articulated mainly by Chief Kaiser Matanzima, Chief Minister of
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the Transkei from 1963, and Prime Minister from independence in 
October of 1976. Many of Chief Matanzima's utterances and actions 
had a bearing on the reactions of the whites of Port St Johns as 
they were widely reported in the news media. Because the Transkei 
was the first "homeland" to be placed on the road to independence, 
there were no precedents upon which either the blacks or whites 
involved in the process could base their demands. Many of the 
negotiations and concessions leading up to "independence", were 
determined by the negotiating strengths of the parties concerned, 
and their requirements of legitimacy, prestige and credibility.
One of the first indications of this internal momentum which was 
ultimately to léad to "independence", was in 1972 when Chief 
Minister Matanzima visited the Prime Minister of South Africa and 
the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, and told 
them that, "he had a mandate from his government to request that 
\ to the land already under its control, be added the white owned
districts of Elliot, and Maclear in the west, and Mount Currie 
(Kokstad) in the north in the north-east, white owned portions of 
the districts of Matatiele and Umzimkulu, also in Griqualand East, 
and the white enclave of Port St Johns in the south-east. These 
lands were historically part of the Transkei, he maintained; their 
transfer would restore the position that existed in 1884. 1
Later in 1972, Matanzima threatened that unless the disputed land 
referred to above was ceded to the Transkei, the Transkeian 
government "would oppose the repatriation from the white areas of 
landless people who had for long periods, been living in cities or 
on the farms of whites." } Q  Tlhiiis move would have frustrated 
the South African government's attempts at "disentangling South 
Africa's multiracial society."
In March of 1975, Chief Minister Matanzima moved in the Transkei 
Legislative Assembly that the Republican government be asked to 
grant full independence to the Transkei within a period of five 
years. Matanzima did however place a condition on this in that 
during this period, the remainder of the land due in terms of the 
1936 Land Act, should be added to the Transkei, but that such 
grants of land should not prejudice the claims of the Transkeian 
government to the districts requested in 1972, as mentioned-abovel®^
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In response to this request for further land by the Transkeian 
government, and the desire of the South African government for the 
Transkei to become "independent", The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 
1976 was passed which provided for the transfer of all outstanding 
quota land (as determined by the 1936 legislation) to a territory 
after it became independent.
As can be seen from the above, Matanzima made the acceptance of 
"independence" conditional upon the handing over of certain white 
owned land and the fulfillment of the 1936 Land Act. Port St Johns 
therefore became a bargaining chip in the Transkei independence 
negotiations.If the Transkei had not accepted "independence", it 
would have been a tremendous set back to the prestige, credibility 
and legitimacy of the National Party race policy.
Besides the land issue, Matanzima was the main articulator of the 
black attitude towards the presence of whites and coloureds in the 
Transkei. This is a further important factor which had a bearing 
on white reactions in Port St Johns.
In 1963 the Transkei Constitution Act was passed which provided 
for, amongst other provisions, Transkeian citizenship, which 
generally meant that black Xhosa-speaking persons became citizens 
of the territory. The creation of Transkeian citizenship raised 
the question of the position of whites and coloureds in the 
territory after independence. In the early years of Matanzima1s 
Chief Ministership, his speeches "abound with determination to 
make the territory exclusively African." ^  In 1965 Matanzima 
told a by-election campaign that "as soon as you allow them 
(whites) to stay and build businesses then they will import their 
sisters, cousins and brothers from overseas. The next thing they 
will demand is the vote - which they will get over my dead body - 
and in no time you will find them claiming the Transkei as 
theirs." 18^
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Later 'Matanzima1s attitude began to soften as regards the presence of 
whites in the Transkei. In February of 1974, Matanzima linked the issue 
of citizenship to the land issue and stated that,
"Whites living within the existing boundaries of the Transkei, 
would not be eligible for citizenship of that territory. If 
however, the additional districts claimed - Elliot, Maclear and 
East Griqualand - were placed under the jurisdiction of his
government, the white farmers and others there could remain and19)become Transkeian citizens if they wished."
In response to statements of this nature, the South African Minister of
Bantu Administration and Development in 1974 said that, "it was not
government policy that whites who owned land that was incorporated in a
homeland, should continue to exercise these land tenure rights, or should
20become citizens of the homeland concerned." 7 He also said that,
"if whites whose properties were to be included in enlarged Bantu 
homelands, accepted citizenship of these homelands in order to 
retain ownership of these properties, they would loose their 
citizenship of the Republic of South Africa. In such cases the 
Republican government would not accept final responsibility for 
buying them out, 'should things at a later stage get too hot for 
them'." 21}
This view was similarly repeated to the Transkei White Citizens' 
'Association by the same Minister later in the year.
Also in 1974, the Chief Minister of Transkei,
"called on whites in the territory 'to hasten slowly in the 
process of withdrawal'. The whole constitutional development of 
the Transkei was to be orderly and a gradual process, he said .
The safety and interests of whites would be well, guarded after
22)independence, as would those of Transkeian citizens."
In August of 1975, Chief Minister Matanzima spelt out more clearly his 
view regarding whites and coloureds in the territory, after independence. 
He said that the territory "would be non-racial, all petty apartheid 
restrictions would be abolished. Whites who cared to revoke their South 
African citizenship and become citizens of the Transkei, would have full
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rights to participate in politics and own land." 23) in juiy 0f 1 9 7 5,
Matanzima stated that in an independentTranskei, "there would be
full equality in every sphere of human activity for blacks and
whites. There would be no discrimination in hotels, land ownership 
241or other amenities." ■
By October of 1976, however, it became apparent that only
Transkeian citizens could own property. In this regard, Matanzima
said that "whites should sell their land to us and rent it from 
251us." He continued that "if the South African government would 
say that black people could acquire property in South Africa, there 
would be no reason why people in the Republic should not acquire 
property in Transkei." ^
The key characteristics of the Tkanskeian government's policy as 
regards whites and coloureds was a policy of African exclusivism in 
the 1960's, and in the 1970's became a policy of non-racialism, but 
with the important limitation that this policy would only apply to 
whites and coloureds who became or were Transkeian citizens.
All of the above statements were widely quoted in the press, and 
therefore had a great bearing on the behaviour of whites and 
coloureds in Port St Johns. Statements of this nature created a 
great deal of uncertainty as the Transkei was the first of the 
homelands to obtain independence, and there was no way of knowing 
how the leadership would behave towards the whites and coloureds 
after independence.
The Announcement of Incorporation and the Reaction
On 11th December, 1973, it was unexpectedly announced over the 
radio and in various newspapers, that Mr M C Botha, Minister of 
Béintu Administration and Development had stated that his Department 
had proposed that the 9247 hectares on which Port St Johns was 
situated be incorporated into the Transkei. The implications of 
this would be that at some future date, the white and coloured 
residents of Port St Johns, would fall under the control and be
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subject to the laws of a black administration. This announcement 
had far reaching implications for the whites and coloureds of Port 
St Johns, and it elicited a variety of reactions, both in the 
immediate and in the long term.
As described above, the residents of Port St Johns had received a
series of solemn and firm assurances over a period of time, from
the highest levels of the South African government, that the area
would "never" fall under the control of a black authority. The
Daily Dispatch therefore reported on the day of the
announcement that, "horror, dismay and disbelief greeted the news ,
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last night that Port St Johns, Alice and Indwe might go black.
The Mayor of Port St Johns was reported as saying two days 
after the announcement that, "it would be better if a government 
delegation headed by the Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development visited the resort to see for themselves what we've 
done for the town." He was referring to what the whites had 
done for the town, and he was also referring to the announcement 
that the Bantu Affairs Commission would hear evidence from 
interested people as regards the proposal. The Mayor was 
suggesting that a delegation of a higher level should be visiting 
the town.
A Coloured leader who had lived in Port St Johns for all his life, 
reacted to the announcement by saying, "I like it here, I want to 
remain here for the rest of my life." ^  The local United Party
Member of Parliament, Mr T G Hughes, responded by saying that "the
3 0 )South African government has broken another solemn promise." , 
Mr C W Eglin, Leader of the Progressive Party believed that the 
proposal was "both sensible and realistic, and it removed an 
important source of irritation between the Transkeian government 
and that of Mr Vorster."
In general terms, the residents of Port St Johns felt betrayed by 
the South African government, which as described above, had been 
prepared to give the residents of Port St Johns written assurances 
that the area would "never" fall urtder bladk control.
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The South African government had been prepared to give this 
assurance on several occasions despite the geopolitical 
absurdity of Port St Johns when looking at it in terms of 
National Party ideology.
Within a few days of the announcement of incorporation, the 
white residents of Port St Johns had established a seven man 
Action Committee comprising representatives of the Town Council, 
the Ratepayers' Association, and the Farmers' Association, under 
the chairmanship of the Mayor of the town. The objective of this 
Committee was to oppose the incorporation of the tpwn into 
the transkei, and the strategy of the Action
Corrmittee, was to demonstrate to the South African government 
the strength of white opposition to the proposal. Part of the 
strategy of the Committee was to gauge the opinions of the 
ratepayers and tourists in regard to the incorporation issue, by 
means of a plebiscite and a straw poll. The results of the 
plebiscite and straw poll were to be presented to the Bantu 
Affairs Commission, which was to sit in Port St Johns on the 
21st January, 1974 to hear evidence. This Cormrission had been 
established by the South African government to investigate the 
question of land and its consolidation in persuance of National 
Party ideology. It was composed of political party 
representatives from the South African parliament with a 
majority being from the governing National Party.
Before the sitting of the Commission, a plebiscite was held 
amongst ratepayers. Ballot papers were sent to all ratepayers 
with the question, "Do you wish Port St Johns to remain as it is 
at present? (Please only state yes or no)". A straw poll was 
held amongst the tourists in Port St Johns at the time, where a 
petition form was circulated to all available tourists and 
replies were obtained from those who wished to respond to it. 
The same question was asked as in the plebiscite. The Action 
Committee sent out 432 ballot papers to occupiers and owners of 
property in Port St Johns. Almost 60 percent of the property 
occupiers and owners responded, and of those who responded, 95 
percent supported the view that Port St Johns should reniáim
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under the control of the South African government. There were 12 
ratepayers who favoured change in the control of Port St Johns. The 
relatively low poll of 60 percent was believed to be due to the fact 
that many ratepayers were out of Port St Johns during the Christmas 
period. The tourist opinion that was canvassed by straw poll (Port St 
Johns is a popular tourist resort and heavily dependent upon them for 
income) was almost unanimous in the view that Port St Johns should 
remain under the control of the South African government.
Shortly before the announcement of the results of the plebiscite and 
straw poll, several hundred Port St Johns residents attended a public 
meeting during which the Mayor of the town and Chairman of the Action 
Committee,
"advocated a defiant front to the Department of Bantu
Administration's proposal that the 9247 hectare district be
handed over to the Transkei. They applauded his call that the
town's newly appointed Action Conmittee tell the Bantu
Affairs Commission, bluntly that they do not wish to become
part of the Black homeland. 'If we fight with all our might,
we will win the day'; the Mayor said confidently to 
321enthusiastic applause." '
After the meeting had taken place and the results of the plebiscite 
and straw poll had been announced, the Action Committee drew up a 
memorandum which was submitted to the Bantu Affairs Commission and 
all members of the South African Parliament. The memorandum detailed 
the reasons why Port St Johns should not be incorporated into the 
Transkei. It began by giving a brief outline of the area, the earlier 
assurances given by the South African government, and gave the 
results of the plebiscite and straw poll. The memorandum also made 
mention of property ownership, and used this issue to explain why 
there might be dissent amongst whites on the issue of incorporation. 
In this regard, the memorandum stated that,
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"The price of land and properties has increased considerably 
over the years, and anybody wishing to sell his property and 
leave Port St Johns, would have had no difficulty in 
obtaining a realistic price for his property. However, it 
would now appear that there are a few persons in Port St 
Johns who have, possibly, not made a success of their 
businesses or their farms, or may wish to leave Port St 
Johns for certain other reasons, and feel that if they were 
to press for Port St Johns to be transferred to the Transkei 
government, that they would receive substantial compensation 
for the government. They most probably feel that they
would receive a better price from the government than from a 
33)
private buyer.
The memorandum also looked at the question of defence, and radio and 
air communications, and the role that Port St Johns could play in 
this regard. As regards defence, the memorandum stated that,
"It is submitted that the government must realise the 
advantages of having retained Walfish Bay, for defence 
purposes, and likewise, it is respectfully submitted that it 
is in the interests of the Republic that Port St Johns 
should also be retained as it will prove to be most 
invaluable for defence purposes in the future."34)
Under sundry information, the memorandum said that,
"The relationship between the whites and the Bantu in the 
area, which has existed for many, many years has always been 
very good. The Bantu look upon the whites as a source of 
income... the whites also create stability in the area, and 
it is doubted whether the local Bantu would want the whites 
to leave Port St Johns.
When the Bantu Affairs Commission sat, almost the entire adult 
population attended the hearing. The Majority of the white 
population still appeared to be in favour of Port St Johns remaining 
outside the control of the Transkeian government, however, thirteen 
property owners (probably including the twelve who had voted no in
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the plebiscite) predicted, "that if Port St Johns remained white,
it would be a source of continual friction between the Transkei
government and the South African goveranment."36) The Coloured
community which also attended the hearings, was divided on the
issue and presented two opposing views. A Coloured person
representing one view, "called for the area to be declared Black
because Coloureds in the town had never been recognised as human
371beings, and had in fact been pushed to the outskirts." ' Another 
member of the Coloured group on the opposing side said that "the 
Coloured community preferred to live in an area under white 
control."38^
These were the public reactions to the proposed incorporation. The 
town had been thrown into a ferment of uncertainty. Everyone 
wanted a final decision as soon as possible.
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CHAPTER 3
THE STUDY OF WHITE ATTITUDES IN 1974
As noted above, the 1974 study was based on wide-ranging and 
detailed in-depth interviews. A representative sample of forty 
Port St Johns residents were selected at random from address 
lists on the numerical voters' roll. It can be assumed that the 
forty carefully selected respondents broadly represented the 
universe of whites in the town at the time.
The residents were encouraged to converse freely in response to 
a series of open-ended questions, and express their views, 
prejudices, hopes, and fears. Under these circumstances, it is 
not normally very easy to crystallise or isolate definite 
patterns from the welter of sentiments and views expressed 
among the sample of residents of Port St Johns.
An attempt has nevertheless been made to isolate and describe 
the more important attitude, patterns prevailing in Port St 
Johns in early 1974. The lengthy verbatim transcripts of the 
interviews were subject to careful classification and coding, 
and eventually processed by computer. The results of this 
process are given in percentages which, obviously can only 
represent broad approximations of the real position.
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Dominant Orientations of the White Group
The following appear to have been the keynote features of the 
consciousness of the community:
- nearly 90 percent feared or anticipated some racialism 
or anti-white discrimination by blacks after 
incorporation;
- about 65 percent feared anti-white hostility, and over 
40 percent feared physical threats to whites;
^  - about 65 percent were uneasy about the loss of
administrative control by whites, and some 45 percent 
feared the consequence of black control over the 
police;
- some 58 percent were uneasy about the breaking of the 
connection between the South African government and 
Port St Johns;
- nearly 55 percent to some degree or another, exhibited 
anti-black hostility;
- an equal proportion, 55 percent, were emotionally
opposed to complete racial integration;
- over 50 percent anticipated insecurity of tenure for 
whites after incorporation;
- slightly over 40 percent believed that the situation 
would become unpredictable under black control;
- over 50 percent anticipated general or various threats
to their material interests, mainly taking the form of 
anxiety over property values, property ownership,
pensions and occupational opportunity;
- slightly more than 50 percent were convinced that
blacks had not effectively absorbed "western" norms, 
standards and values.
About 58 percent of the respondents tended to fear 
black Transkeians in general, and about 43 percent 
tended to fear black government officials. Fairly small 
minorities had positive views of black control, 
administration, and social integration between blacks 
and whites, the proportion holding such views never 
rising above one-third of the community.
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These general attitudes presented above suggest a rather 
unrelieved negativism about change to the racial status quo 
which had prevailed in Port St Johns until the announcement 
proposing incorporation. This pattern however, was not one of 
formless prejudice. Some underlying structure appears to be 
present in the views as evidenced by a Factor Analysis 39  ^
conducted on the type of variables outlined above, and very 
cautiously interpreted. It should be remembered that the 
findings above and below are a picture of prevailing attitudes 
at a specific period in the evolution of the incorporation 
issue, and as time went by, different attitudes in response to 
different variables began to manifest themselves.
The Factor Analysis revealed the following basic factors or 
attitudinal "sets" underlying the sentiments, presented in 
order of their importance in contributing to the overall 
variation in views in the sample:
1. White dominance or "colonial" orientation: this factor 
involves a very structured perception of Africans as a 
subservient category, and of whites as those who should 
properly control affairs. This factor is not associated 
with an inclination to leave Port St Johns after 
incorporation.
2. Alienation from black Transkeians: little
identification with the Tr.anskei or its people, no 
sympathy for blacks. Major identification with South 
Africa and fears of isolation from it. Strong elements 
of racial prejudice. This factor is completely 
unrelated to material or property concerns, and is very 
strongly associated with the desire to leave Port St 
Johns.
3. Anxiety: this factor is comprised mainly of anxieties 
concerning disruption of everyday life, physical 
safety, tenure, and possessions, savings and pensions. 
The position is mildly associated with the inclination 
to leave.
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4. Materialism: this clustering is mainly concentrated on 
fears of loss of profits and material privileges. It is 
not associated with the inclination to leave.
5. Displacement fears: this pattern of concern boils down 
to the anticipation of being displaced in terms of 
space, life-style, occupation and residence. It is 
mildly associated with the decision to leave.
6. Uncertain liberalism: this interesting factor involves 
a clear commitment to multi-racial living, but 
simultaneously comprises marked fears of absolutism in 
black nationalism and of the possibility of black 
racialism. This factor illustrates a minority view 
which is equally alienated from white and black ethnic 
ethusiasms.
Factors Associated with the Inc!ination to Leave or Remain
This Factor Analysis is significant in that it points to the 
fact that it was not necessarily those whites with the crudest 
sentiments of white dominance, or with the sharpest concerns 
about material privilege, who were inclined to leave the town 
of Port St Johns. Cross-tabulation of categories of answers 
from the interviews bear this out as well.
The most important factors which are statistically significant^ 
in their association with the inclination to leave, appear 
as follows:
- fear of isolation from South Africa;
- fear of discrimination against whites in everyday life;
- fear of the consequences on living patterns of social 
integration;
- belief that blacks are insufficiently westernised or 
incapable of becoming '‘westernised";
- fear of popular black demands creating insecurity for 
whites;
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- anxieties over the loss of administrative control of the 
situation by whites;
- fears regarding the loss of savings, pensions and 
properties.
Thus, on the negative side the dominant factors appear to be a 
blend of generalised white prejudice towards blacks, 
uncertainty over the future, and isolation from South Africa as 
a source of security, and fears of threats to the quality of 
everyday life and security. On the positive side, the factors 
most likely to have inclined the residents to remain committed 
to Port St Johns, were sympathy for blacks, identification with 
their circumstances, unprejudiced views, and an identification 
with the Transkei or Port St Johns as their "home". These 
patterns, if both the positive and negative factors are 
considered, bear out the broad trends in the Factor Analysis.
Some Typical Expressions of View, in 1974
It would seem then, that certain general attitude patterns 
could be detected amongst the community in Port St Johns in 
1974. The verbatum sentiments expressed by individuals provide 
illustrations of some of the prevailing attitude patterns at 
the time. Individual views were selected at random from the 
transcripts a'nd are given below. The occupations of the 
individuals quoted are also given, since they frequently are 
associated with the views expressed.
Two of the questions asked in the 1974 survey were, what 
individuals feared most about the future, and what they thought 
about blacks and separate development?
In reply to the question, "what do you fear most about the future?", 
an eighty year old property owner who had retired, said that
"it is very difficult' for elderly people to uproot themselves."
29.
His biggest fear was that, "should I wish to sett my property 
some time in the future, would I be able to obtain ccmpension for 
my property that would enable me to buy property of the same 
standard elsewhere?" As regards the issue of separate 
development, incorporation and race, "T see the logic in the 
Transkei wishing to take over Port St Johns," but he believed 
that if the blacks took over, "it would be a shambles at first." 
He regarded "the natives as my friends. "  Harsh racial views
were fairly typical of many pensioners who had a great financial 
stake in Port St Johns. Some of these responses were "the blacks 
get to the top by bribery and everything that is evil, things’
always worsen when blacks take over," and "the blacks are 
learning slowly, but it will take three hundred years for them 
to catch up with the whites."
A thirty-three year old owner of a general dealer store 
responded in a different way to the same questions posed above. 
Unlike many pensioners, he was not unduly worried about his 
property, and this was most likely because of his belief that
"owners of trading stations that have been bought out in other 
parts, of the Transkei have been treated most fairly. " One of 
his greatest fears was that if Port St Johns was incorporated, 
his South African citizenship would be taken away. He also 
feared that a black take-over of the police force would mean 
that the upper parts of the hierarchy would be dominated by a 
conservative compliant group, and the lower levels would be 
manned by younger blacks "who have been to the cities, and have 
built up a resentment about how they have been treated by 
whites." This would result in retributive justice being meted
out by a black police force. He did not oppose any form of 
integration and believed that it was "inevitable in South Africa 
anyway." As regards the future, and the question of remaining 
after incorporation, he said that he was "prepared to give it a 
go... but if compensation enables me. to establish elsewhere, 
and the future is too uncertain, d cannot stay.”
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In 1982 when the same respondent was interviewed in a similar 
in-depth interview, he felt that "life had changed dramatically 
in Port St Johns. The high up people are getting rich, the 
ordinary people are not bene fitting. Independence has not come 
up to expectations. Faction fights are still rife. Burglaries 
have increased. The whites who have remained are experiencing 
problems with the communications systems, there is no continuity 
with anything. In the streets there is nevertheless a good 
relationship between whites and blacks." This respondent was 
very disappointed that "things had not worked out" and was 
selling his business to the Black Trust for an undisclosed sum 
of money. He was one of three white traders still in Port St 
Johns in 1982.
A sixty-five year old farmer who subsequently left Port St 
Johns, believed that the creation of "homelands" was inevitable. 
His main fear was that "the longer the whites remain in Port St 
Johns, the more difficult it will be for them to re-establish 
elsewhere." He felt that residents should not protest too much 
against incorporation, as this may prolong the time when the 
government gets round to paying compensation for their 
properties. This respondent was going to leave Port St Johns, 
and feared that "after a black take-over, bribery would be 
prevalent because it would be the first time that they (blacks) 
will have had power, but will manage once they have had more 
experience." He, moveover, felt that "there was a definite 
anti-white feeling amongst the modem generation. You cannot 
blame them, some whites treat them roughly."
A seventy-three year old farmer who had lived in Port St Johns 
since 1912, and still farmed there in 1982, feared that if Port 
St Johns was incorporated, "everyone will go, and we will loose 
all our friends." He moreover believed that he would be forced 
out by blacks stealing his possessions. He nevertheless did not 
wish to leave and had not considered the matter of property 
compensation.
31.
In 1982 this respondent still owned six properties in Port St 
Johns. The Transkei government was in the process of buying 
five of the properties and thp respondent also felt that at the 
age of eighty-one he was getting too old to farm. He still did 
not wish to leave Port St Johns, but was nevertheless critical 
of independence as a solution to race problems. He was also 
critical of the black police force and their inability to stop 
thieving. Despite these criticisms, this respondent still 
wished to stay on in Port St Johns and own property. He applied 
for citizenship but his application had been turned down.
The level of education amongst the coloured population tended 
to be very low and furthermore, there was not a great degree of 
understanding of the issues involved amongst this group. 
According to one coloured property owner, the area should be 
incorporated, and he believed that this was the feeling of the 
majority of the coloureds in the town. He had no fear of 
incorporation and felt that "although we have never had a taste 
of the other government, (Transkei) surely it will not he worse 
than the present government." He feared neither a black nor a 
white government, as "the coloured people are not a nation. We 
are part and parcel of the whites, and part and parcel of the 
blacks. So we can claim from either group." He had no intention 
of leaving the Transkei.
Another respondent was a thirty-seven year old civil servant, 
who said that the announcement of incorporation did not affect 
him, "as he could always apply for a transfer.” This civil 
servant was a National Party supporter, and true to the beliefs 
of his Party, felt that the area should "go black, or be 
incorporated." He had. no fear of the future, and believed that 
“people would be compensated according to property values in 
Pretoria." He was not altogether fearless of the future, and 
felt that "it would not be good living under a homeland 
government. Lower educational standards would prevail, and only 
the children of the privileged blacks would be educated." This 
civil servant was later replaced: by a black Transkeian.
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Finally, a bank manager believed that people's greatest fear 
was whether they would be compensated for their properties, and 
how much compensation they would receive, and when? This 
respondent said that he would like to stay in Port St Johns." I
like Port St Johns very much. The future seems a bit bleak in 
some ways. I think that the white ■police should stay for a 
couple of years. I would feel safer. Black police are not very 
efficient, but they will be in time." He fel t that dual 
citizenship may be a good idea as it would "encourage those who 
are not afraid of integration to stay, because they will no 
longer feel abandoned by the South African government, and at 
the same time would feel accepted by the Transkei government 
and more welcome." He also felt that for "the first couple of 
years, it would be most uncomfortable living under the 
Transkeian government." Like the civil servant mentioned 
above, the bank manager did not own property in Port St Johns, 
and being attached to a large banking group, could request a 
transfer to another part of South Africa.
As far as expectations of the future were concerned the 
responses of individuals once again reflect the influence of 
their occupations. The longer pensioners had lived in Port St 
Johns, the less inclined they were to leave. The most immediate 
reaction of nearly all pensioners was, "what about my property, 
will I be compensated adequately to be able to buy the 
equivalent property elsewhere?" Pensioners also were 
concerned about a black police force, and the ability of the 
police force to protect white interests.
As far as the businessmen were concerned., their attitude 
towards incorporation was largely determined by future business 
prospects. The building trade came to a halt after the 
announcement, and those businessmen who relied heavily on this 
trade were more inclined to support the idea of incorporation 
and sell their businesses. The number of tourists visiting Port 
St Johns seemed to decline somewhat after the announcement and 
in subsequent years, and this di<i to some extent affect 
businesses which relied on this trade, but not to the extent of 
the building industry and its effect, on other businesses.
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General dealer businessmen were less inclined to leave 
Port St Johns. Businessmen were also concerned about their 
security under the black police force, but tended to be less 
racially prejudiced than the pensioners.
Businessmen were generally more philosophical in their approach 
to Transkeian independence, and one businessman felt that
"blacks can manage the Transkei in time if they have training." 
When looking at the race issue in terms of greater South 
Africa, this respondent felt that "we are going to have 
integration if we are not going to have bloodshed, because 
whites are in the minority. It is no credit being b o m  white, 
but a matter of ■pure chance. We cannot say we are superior, but 
have had better advantages."
Similar to the pensioners, the farmers who had been in Port St 
Johns the longest, were least inclined to want to leave. 
However, the majority of the farmers felt that the sooner they 
left, the easier it would be for them to re-establish 
elsewhere. This attitude is probably because farming tends to 
be a more long term enterprise. The fanners tended to be more 
racially prejudiced than the businessmen.
Finally public and private sector employees also tended to take 
a fairly philosophical view of the issue of incorporation. They 
had steady incomes, and their organisations were obviously 
frequently linked to organisations in other parts of South 
Africa. They could therefore reasonably easily seek employment 
or transfers to other parts of South Africa. There tended to be 
a fairly general mix of racial attitudes within this group.
The coloured group was divided on the issue of incorporation 
and as pointed out above, few of thpm owned property.
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CHAPTER 4
THE DECISION AND INCORPORATION
Beginning on the 18th February, 1974, the issue of incorporation 
was taken up in the South African Parliament by Mr T G Hughes, 
United Party Member of Parliament for Griqualand East, the 
constituency into which the Transkei fell. A few weeks earlier a 
South African parliamentary election had been called and the issue 
of incorporation was used by that party. Forty percent of the 
whites of Port St Johns were definite United Party supporters. 
The United Party did not support the incorporation of Port St 
Johns into the Transkei.
Mr Hughes began his first speech to Parliament on the issue by 
referring to the recommendation made by the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development in regard to Port St Johns, and 
also to the demands made by the Chief Minister of the Transkei as 
briefly referred to above. These events he contended, had led to 
a certain amount of disquiet in the Port St Johns area, 
particularly amongst the property owners. Mr Hughes then sketched 
the written assurances given to the residents of Port St Johns as 
referred to above, and concluded his speech by saying that,
"Now with the suggestion that the independence of the 
Transkei is imminent, one can appreciate how worried these 
people in the Transkei are. I appeal to the Prime Minister 
now, in this debate, to give us an assurance that they 
will be looked after, and if he can, to give us other 
details of what will be negotiated with the Chief Minister 
when independence is granted..... some publicity should be 
given to the Prime Minister's intention so that the people 
in the Transkei can know what is going to happen. After 
all this is a new development, and at the present moment
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they are most upset and feel very insecure."
The South African government's response to this Situation was also 
of crucial importance to how whites and coloureds reacted to the 
prospect of black rule in Port St Johns.
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In reply to Mr Hughes' speech, Mr M C Botha, Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development at the time, said that "there is 
only one attitude with which these matters concerning the 
acquisition of land can be'approached, and that is an attitude 
of honesty and sincerity..... We must be honest and we must be
sincere, and not only to the one side, we must be honest and 
sincere to the Bantu peoples involved...... in this case the
peoples of the Transkei - and we must be honest and sincere to 
the whites who are involved in this." ^  In referring to the 
written promises as quoted above, the Minister said that, "we 
did not make promises in the ordinary sense of the word. The 
word ’promise1 is of course a propagandists and 
emotionally-laden word." He continued that the government 
could be accused of recklessness if they did not consider Port 
St Johns together with the provision of more land for blacks 
and the constitutional development of the Transkei. The 
Minister also said, and this was crucial to the future of 
whites in Port St Johns that, "the government will accept 
fiill responsibility of buying out the whites who own land and 
other possessions there, properly on a valuation basis, and to 
compensate them for the properties they own."^ The buying out 
of these properties was to be done in terms of a white paper 
issued in 1964. This White Paper also provided for the creation 
of an Adjustment Committee which was to value properties to be 
purchased.
The issue of the incorproation of Port St Johns was again 
raised in the South African Parliament in September of 1974, 
and then again during the consideration of the first report of 
a select committee on Bantu Affairs in May of 1975. In regard 
to Port St Johns, the Minister said during the debate on this 
report, "that after thorough consideration, we came to the 
conclusion that Port St Johns could not prosper for all times 
as a white spot in these changed circumstances; it would also 
be unfair to leave the small isolated comnunity to itself or to
the Tlranskei, and of course it would also be undesirable to 
subsidize or to try and carry it articially from outside. 
Apart from these considerations, Port St Johns forms a natural 
unit with the Transkei. ' This was the first official 
indication that Port St Johns would fall under a black 
authority.
As far as the time that it would take to purchase white 
properties and finalize government consolidation plans was 
concerned, the Minister said that "it would be extremely 
unwise of me to mention a date or a period here, since the 
whole process is dependent on various social, economic and 
financial considerations.... the Departmental machinery of my 
Department, and the Department of Agricultural Credit and Land 
Tenure..... has already been adjusted in a way to allow of 
purchases being effected on a far larger scale than in the
past. As more funds are made available by Parliament for land
46)purchases, so the rate of the purchase can be accelerated."
An amount of R25 million was voted for the purchase of land
during the 1974-75 budget year. The Minister continued, "I
want to give the assurance to the white farmers who want to
part with their land.... that the government will expedite the
process of the acquisition of land as far as possible within
47)the limits of financial circumstances."
Land owners were therefore at the mercy of the government and 
the availability of finances. At this stage there was no 
clarity on the position of small property owners.
Besides the availability of funds for compensation, people 
wanted to know what compensation they were to receive and 
when. The stage at which people could leave Port St Johns 
should they wish, was determined by the availability/of funds 
and the criteria of priorities in deciding who to first conpen- 
sate. A further factor compounding the uncertainty prevailing 
amongst the people of Port St Johns, was that in view of the
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Transkei becoming independent in October of 1976, and the 
incorporation issue now settled, the whites of Port St Johns 
would then be living in a foreign state.
In December of 1975, a circular letter was sent to all 
property owners by the South African government. In a 
Pariiamentary debate, the Minister elaborated on this circular 
by saying that one of the priorities of this circular was to 
first purchase township land so that it could not be developed 
and later become more expensive to acquire by the Bantu Trust. 
The next priority was to consider the properties of "sick
people, and people who cannot continue with their work, and we
481consider estate cases and court orders, and so on." '
The procedure that the whites of Port St Johns had to follow 
in selling their properties, was that they had to complete a 
form, which was submitted through the local magistrate, to the 
Adjustment Committee and the Black Trust which would then make 
an offer to buy the property. This procedure was to be 
followed if the white property owner could not find a black 
buyer through advertising. If properties were advertised, 
the advertisement would be "meant for Black owners, the colour 
group which should be the ultimate owners of the Transkei.**49)
However, a white could not sell to a black, unless the 
property lay in a released or black zoned area. Should a black 
acquire a property in a white area, then "the State President
would have beeen required to grant a black buyer permission to
50)own a property in a white area." Few blacks at the time 
could afford to purchase white properties at their normal 
market value, and therefore, white property owners, if they 
wanted to sell their properties, were almost compelled to sell 
them to the Black Trust. When this procedure was adopted,
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properties were sold to blacks for considerably reduced 
prices. An example of this was a property which was bought 
from a white in Port St Johns for R39 000 and sold for R8 000 
to a black Transkeian.
In June of 1976, with the impending independence of the 
Transkei, the recently formed Transkei White Citizens' 
Association ( TWCA) began to interest itself in the plight of 
the White property owners of Port. St Johns, as well as the 
whites in the Transkei as a whole. Through the local white 
Member of the South African Parliament, Mr T G Hughes, this 
Association petitioned Parliament, "for leave to be heard at 
the Bar of the House by counsel in opposition to the 
provisions of the Transkei Bill." This Bill provided for the 
eventual legal independence of the Transkei. The motion also 
requested that "such counsel be heard at the Bar of the House 
at such time as the House may direct", and also requested that 
"a select committee be appointed to inquire into and report 
upon the position of the South African citizens presently 
owning property in the Transkei." ^ '
A request to be heard at the Bar of the House, was an unusual 
one in South African parliamentary tradition, and is an 
indication of the desperation of the white property owners in 
the Transkei at the tite. As explained by Mr Hughes in the 
ensuing debate, the motivation behind the petition was that 
white residents in the Transkei wanted the assurance that they 
could sell their property, and leave the Transkei when they 
wished. No provision had been made in the Status of Transkei 
Bill for compensation for South African citizens who owned 
properties and businesses in the Transkei after independence. 
The petitioners were also perturbed about the meagre funds 
that had been set aside by the Government for the acquisition 
of properties. Moreover, these citizens were not satisfied 
with the priority scheme as set out in the 1964 White Paper. 
They felt that this priority scheme should fall away, and
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their properties be bought out immediately. They were also 
unhappy about the payment for properties by means other than 
ready cash. These citizens therefore wanted legislation to 
protect them after independence, and guarantee them 
compensation and sufficient funds so that those who wished to 
sell their properties and leave before independence could do 
so. They believed that after independence, the South African 
Parliament would have no right to interfere in the affairs of 
the Transkei.
The Minister replied to the main provisions of the petition by 
saying that properties had been bought in terms of the 
provisions of the White Paper for the past twelve years. He 
moreover said that there was an agreement in existence between 
the Transkeian and the South African government as regards the 
purchasing and compensation awarded for properties. The 
Minister pointed out that Clause 5 of the Status Bill provided 
for pre-existing rights and agreements to become binding after 
independence. He consequently dismissed the proposal to submit 
a petition to parliament.
Mr Hughes replied to the Minister by saying, "what the people 
of the Transkei wanted was legislation which can force the 
government to take action. There is nothing which gives them 
any rights... They want an Act which states that the 
Government 'shall' buy, not that this government can enter 
into a contract with the Transkei Government that the Bantu
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Trust 'may' buy." The crucial part of Mr Hughes argument 
was that properties 'may' be bought by the Bantu Trust; it was 
not obligatory on the Bantu Trust to buy white properties, and
moreover these properties could be purchased at prices which
52)"may be approved by the Minister" The question was also 
posed as to what would happen if white properties in an 
independent Transkei were nationalised, or a capital gains tax 
was imposed on the proceeds from a sale . Questions of this 
nature created a great deal of uncertainty amongst property 
owners in Port St Johns.
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Later in the debate, the Deputy Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development Dr A P Treunecht stated that, 
"it is financially and administratively impossible to buy all 
the land and properties from whites in the Transkei before 
26th October." ^
The Deputy Minister also announced that during the 1976-77
financial year, R3,5 million had been spent on the purchase of
properties, and several more million Rand would be spent on
the purchase of properties. He continued that "according to an
agreement with the Cabinet of the Transkei, the assurance was
gained that after independence, the process of land purchases 
541would simply continue." J These were the strongest assurances 
that the South African government would give it's citizens in 
the Transkei. The provisions of the White Paper, and the 
policy as regards the purchase of properties in the Transkei, 
applied to the coloureds as well as the whites.
In May of 1976, it was reported that a South African 
government evaluator had begun assessing the value of white 
properties in Port St Johns. His findings were to be submitted 
to the Bantu Trust which would determine the offer to be made. 
It was estimated at this stage that the majority of the 271 
privately owned properties in Port St Johns had been offered 
for sale.
The Transkei became independent on 26th October, 1976, and 
Port St Johns and its white and coloured residents became 
subjects of the Transkei government. The Transkei and South 
African government's policy as regards the presence of 
non-Transkeian property owners in the Transkei was given 
legislative backing with the passing of the Acquisition of 
Immovable Property Control Act, 1977. This legislation stated 
that "no person who is not a citizen of Transkei, no company 
in which a controlling interest is held by and on behalf of 
any person who is not a citizen of Transkei... shall acquire 
immovable property without thé approval of the said
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Minister." This Act moreover, stated that "a testamentary
disposition or intestate succession by which any person,
company or body of persons would acquire or hold any immovable
property.... be deemed to be a testamentary disposition of or
succession in respect of the nett proceeds of such 
56)
property." 'This meant that non-Transkeian citizens, who in 
the case of Port St Johns, were largely South African whites, 
could not purchase or inherit property in this territory.
As a result of South African and Transkeian policy and 
legislation, the dice was definitely loaded against a white 
property owning class in the Transkei.
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CHAPTER 5
PORT ST JOHNS REVISITED 1981 - 1982
In 1981-1982, Port St Johns was revisited, and in-depth 
interviews were conducted amongst almost all the remaining 
white residents and several of the leading coloured residents. 
The population numbers for 1982 as compared with 1974 are as 
follows: 57^
1974 1982
Number of whites 483 58
Number of coloureds 182 182
Number of white property owners 219 51
Number of coloured property owners 7 3
Of the white population in 1982, no more than approximately 48 
had lived there from before the time of the announcement of 
incorporation. Many of the whites who had left had moved to 
the Cape Coast and the Natal South Coast. The numbers of the 
coloured population remained stagnant, and this was because 
many of the younger and better educated members of this group 
moved to centres in South Africa in search of employment. Port 
St Johns had changed dramatically with the major exodus of 
whites.
According to the 1981-1982 Municipal Voters' Roll, there were 
51 white property owners, and three coloured property owners. 
Of the 51 white property owners, 16 were resident in Port St 
Johns, the remainder being resident in various parts of South 
Africa. All three coloured property owners resided in Port St 
Johns. The diminuition in the number of white and coloured 
property owners was as a result of the purchases made by the 
South African Black Trust.
>
4 3.
In 1982, approximately 25 percent of the resident white 
population consisted of pensioners, 25 percent farmers, 25 
percent businessmen, and the remaining 25 percent, public and 
private enterprise employees. It appears that in 1982, 
approximately 30 percent of the coloured population was 
unemployed, and most of them belonged to the artisan group. Of 
the white and coloured population in 1982, seven members were 
seconded to the Municipality and the tourist industry by the 
South African government to assist in various key posts.58) 
These people would not have been in Port St Johns had they not 
been seconded by the South African government.
In the in-depth interviews, an attempt was made to discover 
why those residents who had lived in Port St Johns since 
incorporation had remained there, and why approximately 400 
whites had left the town. Respondent's memories tended to be 
short, and they could not always readily recall all the 
specific events in the past which might have had a bearing on 
their views and decisions. Nevertheless they were fully aware 
of major local factors impinging on the decisions of white 
residents.
Some Typical Expressions of View, 1981-1982
While certain general attitude patterns could be detected 
amongst the community of Port St Johns in 1981-82, it was not 
as easy to detect links between attitudes and occupations 
because of the smaller number of respondents involved, as it 
was in 1974. Two of the questions asked in 1981-82 were "how 
does life in Port St Johns compare with life before 
independence? "and "how do you see the future?" The responses 
to these questions by some of the people interviewed, selected 
at random, are given below, since they are fairly typical of 
the general attitude patterns amongst the community remaining 
in Port St Johns in 1981-82 .
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A white farmer who had lived in Port St Johns all his life, 
believed that "there is no difference living here now. My 
wife misses the social life that existed when there were more 
whites. There is not enough willingness on the part of the 
whites to include blacks. There is: not much mixing between 
whites and blacks - this probably because of cultural 
differences. With a few whites in key services, standards 
would improve. Blacks tend to look up to the white man for 
leadership." As far as the independence idea is concerned, 
this respondent said that, "the Transkei is so heavily 
dependent upon South Africa, it cannot really cope on its 
own. Transkei as part of a federation is probably the 
answer."
As far as the future was concerned, this respondent had 
recently sold his farm to the Black Trust in accordance with 
the procedure described earlier, and was leasing it back from 
the Transkei government on a month to month basis. He felt 
that this situation was unsatisfactory, and was trying to 
obtain a longer term lease agreement, but at that stage had 
not had any success. If he could not lease his farm on a 
longer term basis he would feel compelled to leave Port St 
Johns. In this case, the respondent's security of tenure on 
his farm was the determining factor as to whether he would 
remain in Port St Johns. Variables like an unfavourable 
attitude towards the black group and declining standards of 
various public services were not as important considerations 
in this respondent's decision to leave Port St Johns. This 
respondent was typical of other private farmers both white 
and coloured who wished to remain, but were also subject to 
short term lease agreements.
A 73 year old pensioner who had played a prominent role in 
the Action Committee which fought for Port St Johns to remain 
out of the Transkei had no intention of leaving the town. He
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felt that "by and large, since independence, things had gone 
smoothly. People who left felt that a black police force 
would not look after white interests. The bldck police want 
to show the whites that they can keep order. On the whole the 
black police have done quite well." As regards Transkeian 
independence, this respondent said that, riindependence is no 
solution to the black-white question. Independence is perhaps 
a start in finding a solution. Federation is probably the 
answer." This respondent said that he would continue living 
in Port St Johns for as long as conditions remained as they 
were. He would lose friends as people left, but he would also 
gain new friends. This respondent still owned property and 
did not seem concerned about the security of his property. 
The other white pensioners responded in similar ways to the 
same issues.
A coloured businessman who had lived in Port St Johns since 
1984, and ran a clothing store and a small holding felt that
"life has been good in Port St Johns since independence. 
Coloured people are now treated as human beings. There was 
a lot of discrimination before independence. Whites used to 
kick coloureds off the pavement. Since independence, many of 
the racists have gone, and other whites have changed for the 
better. Blacks, whites and coloureds ■now get on well 
together." This respondent was not supportive of separate 
development, but did admit that things had improved under the 
Transkei government. This respondent intended to remain in 
Port St Johns indefinitely.
A white hotel manager felt that "the independence idea was 
not a solution to the race question. Federation would 
probably be the answer. Blacks feel sad when many whites 
leave Port St Johns. The relations between black and white 
are good." This respondent was not a property owner, but 
was leaving Port St Johns because the hotel that he managed 
was being sold and he had a loyalty to a previous owner.
4 6.
It appeared as if many of the whites, although often reluctant 
to talk about such matters, felt that the future under 
President Matanzima might be unpredictable. "He is a law unto 
himself" was a commentvinch seemed to sum up the feelings of 
several respondents.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ANATOMY OF AN EXODUS
Dominant Orientations in 1981 - 1982 as compared with 1974
As compared with the data in the 1974 study, the following 
appear to have been the keynote features of the consciousness 
of the remaining white community of Port St Johns in 1982;®\the 
1974 percentage in brackets):
- about 80 percent (65%) were uneasy about the loss of 
administrative control by whites;
- nearly 80 percent (45%) were uneasy about control over 
the black police force;
- almost 90 percent (58%) felt uneasy about the breaking 
of the connection between South Africa and Port St 
Johns;
- about 73 percent (50%) of the population were opposed to 
complete racial integration;
- again another 73 percent (40%) feared an unpredictable 
future under the Transkeian government;
- nearly 36 percent (50%) of the population felt that 
their material interests would be threatened in the 
future;
- almost the entire population (50%) believed that blacks 
had not effectively absorbed "western", norms, standards 
and values;
- about 30 percent (65%) feared anti-white hostility, and 
no more than 20 percent (40%) feared physical threats to 
whites;
- there was virtually no anti-black hostility in 1981-1982 
as compared with 55 percent in 1974;
- approximately 9 percent (55%) of the population were 
opposed to complete racial integration;
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Factors in the Flight of Whites
The reactions of the Port St Johns community between the years 
1974 and 1982 reflect a complexity of interacting factors. The 
ways in which each of the numerous factors influenced white 
and coloured reactions to the incorporation issue cannot be 
precisely determined. As pointed out above, respondents have 
short memories and cannot always recall the particular 
occurrences which may have influenced their attitudes. Further, 
there are local issues or events which influence behaviour very 
directly and immediately, like a good offer for a property. 
There are also more remote developments or series of events, 
perhaps in another part of Africa which might influence a 
person's attitudes in a less direct way. The different factors 
are difficult to disentangle. Nevertheless, an attempt will now 
be made to place the key factors that influenced white and 
coloured reactions in Port St Johns in some sort of 
perspective. An attempt will also be made to try and describe 
the type of person who left or remained in Port St Johns after 
incorporation, and to draw conclusions from this.
Historical factors: In both series of interviews, very few 
respondents sought historical justification for the whites 
leaving or remaining in Port St Johns. The few respondents who 
referred to the history of the area, believed that Port St 
Johns had been "bought" in an honest and acceptable way from 
the Mpondo. Nobody believed that Port St Johns had been seized 
from the Mpondo, and therefore this was never a reason for 
whites wanting to leave Port St Johns and return it to black 
control. Only in a very small number of cases was this 
historical event suggested as a reason for remaining in Port St 
Johns.
Previous dislocation in the Transkei: As pointed out above, 24 
percent of the breadwinners affected by incorporation in 1974, 
had been traders in other small towns in the Transkei. They had
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been extruded from other towns in accordance with "separate 
development" policy and had in most cases retired to Port St 
Johns. They were therefore well acquainted with the 
implications of "separate development" but had moved to Port 
St Johns on the basis of the assurances given to them as 
referred to above. The announcement of the incorporation of 
Port St Johns was perhaps an even greater shock to them than 
to others in that they would once again have to put their 
properties up for sale. In a few cases the reaction in the 
words of one resondent was, "Oh no not again. Let me get out 
and he done with ■ this as soon as possible. I want. to move 
somewhere where I will not have to go through this ordeal 
again." This factor was of lesser significance;in people1 s 
decisions to leave Port St Johns as only 24 percent of the 
population had been affected in this way.
Political ideology: The logic and evolution of "separate
development" policy and its goal of "disentangling" ethnic 
groups, was an unsettling factor in the minds of some whites 
in Port St Johns. There were people who supported the policy 
in its broader principle but who could not reconcile 
themselves to its specific consequences for their own future 
in Port St Johns. For some this represented a very large 
political dilemma. As mentioned abovei,40 percent of the 
population of Port St Johns were United Party supporters, and 
this party believed that the area should not be incorporated 
into the Tanskei. For this group of people, the incorporation 
issue did not represent as great a dilemma as it did for 
supporters of the National and Progressive Parties which 
supported incorporation. This factor was again of lesser 
importance, however.
Material interests: As referred to above, the 1971-1972 Port
St Johns Municipal Voters' Roll, contained the,names of 219 
property owners, of whom seven were coloured owners. If 
spouses were also considered to be the owners of husbands' or 
wives' property, then nearly 90 percent of the population of
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Port St Johns in 1974, were property owners. As also mentioned 
above, no less than 40 percent of the residents of Port St 
Johns were pensioners, and most of these people had invested 
their life savings in their properties and in South African 
savings institutions. They had often carefully planned ahead 
so as to ensure just sufficient income to live on after their 
properties had been fully paid off. They were in no position 
to buy new properties elsewhere without receiving compensation 
for their existing properties in Port St Johns. They therefore 
feared that if Port St Johns was incorporated into the 
Transkei their properties might be nationalised or confiscated 
by the Transkeian government. A similar school of thought 
applied to the businessmen and fanners who were still 
economically active. The reaction therefore was to "join: the 
queue" and make their properties available for sale to the 
"Black Trust". Besides the fear of what might happen to their 
properties, the whites also had a fear as to what might happen 
to their savings and pensions invested in"foreign" 
institutions. Similarly, the businessmen and farmers became 
concerned about the future profitability of their respective 
enterprises.
Immediately after the announcement, all property sales in the 
town ceased and the sole estate agent in the town found 
himself out of business. This had a trigger reaction and 
brought a halt to the building industry which in turn left 
people unemployed, reduced purchasing power and in turn 
depressed the activity of other businessmen. Furthermore, 
after the announcement the tourist industry suffered 
dramatically and this in turn had a further effect upon 
business profitability. From a material point of view there 
was an incentive for people to leave for towns where they 
could again make good profits in their respective occupational 
areas.
The material factor in the exodus from Port St Johns was 
reinforced by the offers eventually made by the South African 
"Black Trust" for white properties, which were in
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excess of the normal market values of the properties 
concerned. This policy was also seen by some as compensation 
from the South African government for reneging on their 
promises to keep Port St Johns under white control, and as an 
inducement for whites to leave Port St Johns, and thereby 
assist in the "disentangling" of South Africa's multiracial 
society to fit in with National Party ideology. Material 
considerations became increasingly important as the initial 
emotionalism surrounding the incorporation issue began to 
subside.
Reduction of Vital Facilities:
As the exodus gathered momentum, whites became increasingly 
concerned about the shortage of medical facilities. The 
retired doctors who lived in the town and provided the 
community with medical services also left with the general 
migration from Port St Johns. There were moreover no hospital 
facilities nearby. An ageing population is more likely to 
require medical services than a young population, and Port St 
Johns had an ageing white population. Linked to this was the 
take-over of the telephone service by a black staff. Many 
respondents felt that this would mean a decline in the service 
and would make it more difficult to obtain medical hélp in an 
emergency. This was an important factor in making some of the 
older whites who were perhaps not so well, leave the town.
Physical security: Respondents were also very concerned about 
the physical security of their persons and properties. Some of 
the questions asked by property owners were, "would a black 
police force protect my property from being burgled?" Similarly., 
the farmer would question whether "a black police force could 
and would be prepared to prevent stock or farm produce from 
being stolen?" The issue of a black police force went further,
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and whites would ask whether a black policeman would be 
prepared to "assist a white who was being attacked by a black?" 
In 1981-82, nearly double the proportion of whites in the 
population as compared with 1974 were uneasy about black 
control over a black police force. However, in 1981-82 nothing 
suggestive of "retribution" seemed to have been meted out to 
any of the whites and coloureds remaining in the town.
Uncertainty about future residential security: Before and after 
the announcement of incorporation, some of the statements made 
by Matanzima and officials of the South African government 
concerning land and citizenship appeared in the local daily 
newspaper, the Daily Dispatch and the Sunday newspapers. The 
Daily Dispatch was the only English language newspaper to 
circulate in Port St Johns, and therefore this newspaper was 
one of the greatest sources of information for the local 
people. Many of these statements carried conflicting messages 
and were most unsettling. For example, at one stage Matanzima 
said that "the interests of the whites would be guarded after 
independence," and the South African government said that it 
would not "accept final, responsibility for',buying:out whites 
after independence." Whites in the area simply did not know 
where they stood in regard to their properties and future 
security when statements of this nature were made. Most of the 
communication with the residents of Port St Johns seems to have 
been conducted through the press. People wished to rid
themselves of the portracted state of uncertainty, and the 
obvious way of doing this was to leave Port St Johns.
The factor of uncertainty about the future was moreover 
compounded by the fact that the South African government could 
not give any timetable as to when white and coloured properties 
would be purchased, and over what period of time. If a specific 
timetable had been agreed to by the South African and Transkeian 
governments as regards the purchasing of propérty, then the 
pattern of migration from Port St Johns might have been 
somewhat different.
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Isolation from South Africa: A further important factor 1 inked 
to the incorporation issue was the fear among South African 
citizens who remained in Port St Johns that they might be 
forced to relinquish their South African citizenship under a 
Transkeian government. There was also the fear that South 
African citizens remaining in Port St Johns might have to 
travel with a Transkeian passport and as one resident said 
"where can one go on a Transkei passport?" They also feared 
losing the protection of a fairly reliable and predictable 
South African government and enjoying only the protection of a 
Transkeian government with no track record.
Transkeian citizenship was perceived to hold out very few 
benefits for South African citizens who wished to remain in Port 
St Johns. The only real benefit was Transkeian citizens could 
own and bequeath property, whereas South African citizens could 
not do so. In 1981-82 very few whites remaining in Port St 
Johns had applied for Transkeian citizenship, and even fewer 
had received it. It would appear as if there was a reluctance 
on the part of the Transkeian government to award citizenship 
to whites remaining in Port St Johns, and this was a further 
incentive for people to leave.
Unease about black administration: The incorporation of Port St 
Johns and the granting of independence to the Transkei also 
meant that whites would loose administrative control over the 
civil service and police and this would rësult in declining 
standards of service. The unease over the loss of
administrative control by whites had increased quite 
substantially between 1974 and 1981-82. These feats were vague 
and generally unfounded but nevertheless represented compelling 
emotional reactions to the changes.
Attitudinal factors and the people who remained: Some of the 
broad factors we have reviewed, like the historical and 
ideological considerations, appear to have had little bearing
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on the decision to lëave or stay in Port St Johns. Other 
factors like material interests, concern about physical and 
residential security, fears regarding the standards of 
services and health facilities as well as the concern about 
the consequences of possible loss of South African citizenship 
are much more salient. It was these factors, material and 
non-material interests which dominated the process of change 
leading to the exodus of whites from the area.
These material and non-material interests, however, were blanket 
factors or what can be referred to as "saturated variables", 
inasmuch as they represented concerns which were present among 
virtually everyone. What is most important is that they were 
also present among the few people that remained in 1982.
Some other factors, therefore, must have been present to 
inhibit decisions to leave, or at least to delay the decision 
to leave as long as possible (some of the people remaining in 
the town in 1982 were destined to leave). Our evidence 
suggests very strongly that these factors which intervened 
between interests and the early decision to léave, are 
dominantly composed of racial attitudes.
In an earlier section we discussed a factor analysis of the 
responses in 1974 which suggested a cluster of attitudes which 
we called alienation from black Transkeians was very strongly 
associated with an intention to leave Port St Johns. This 
factor analysis is confirmed by the 1981-82 interviews among 
people who had remained. At the latter date there was 
virtually no anti-black hostility whereas more than half of 
the 1974 respondents evinced this sentiment. Only some three 
out of ten people who remained specifically feared active 
anti-white hostility from blacks, whereas well over six out of 
ten feared it in 1974. In fact one of the notable features 
about the white group in 1981-82 was that they tended to have 
a greater degree of tolerance and sympathy for local blacks,
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their aspirations and abilities in running essential services 
in the community. This tolerance did not necessarily extend to 
the central government and leadership of the Transkei state, 
but there appeared to be full acceptance of blacks as people 
in the local community.
It is possible, of course, that a certain amount of suppression 
of unfavourable racial attitudes took place in 1981-82 for 
fear that such attitudes might be transmitted to the 
Transkeian government. However, several black and coloured 
informants confirmed the fact that the racists in the' ;white 
community had left by 1982.
The dominant tendency, both in 1974 and in 1981-1982 was for 
each group to associate and identify with their own group. 
Individual social contacts across racial lines were infrequent 
in 1974 and a little more frequent in 1981-82.Friendships 
generally tended to be formed by whites only within their 
white group, and one of the reasons given by white women for 
wanting to leave Port St Jdhns, was a diminishing circle of 
white friends. Whites found that they could not substitute 
coloured and black friendships for white friendships, and this 
would often be rationalised as being the result of "cultural 
differences." However, there definitely appears to have been 
more contact across racial lines in 1981-82 as compared with 
1974, and it appears that the people more likely to be able to 
bridge the social gap, remained in Port St Johns in 1981-82.
The basic character of the whites who remained in Port St 
Johns in 1981-82 was simply different to that of the white 
person who had left. They were fairly well disposed towards a 
multi-racial society, and would even accept this approach as a 
solution to the greater South African racial question.
They regarded Port St Johns as their "home" and they would 
very often say, " J will not he able to find another home like 
this." A few people remained there for material interests, as
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they had general dealer shops well situated to benefit from 
the slowly recovering tourist trade. The whites who remained 
in Port St Johns remained there very much in defiance of the 
grand plan of "separate development" and sometimes on the 
basis of personal relationships and assurances given to them 
by the Transkei governmental elite which tended to see them 
as being of no threat to Transkeian interests.
Port St Johns compared with Mafikeng in Bophuthatswana
In 1980 the white town of Mafikeng was incorporated into the
newly independent nation state of Bophuthatswana. A 
59)study was undertaken shortly before incorporation of the
attitudes of the whites to the eventual incorporation of the 
town. A large majority of seven out of ten of the respondents 
indicated a willingness to accept incorporation. This finding 
has since been vindicated by the stability of the 
white population subsequent to incorporation.
A comparison of the findings of the present study and the 
Mafikeng study is useful in suggesting how the incorporation 
of Port St Johns might have been handled in a better way. The 
Mafikeng study, however, suffers from certain weaknesses in 
that it does not consider the events leading up to the 
eventual incorporation of the town, and has little to say 
about white attitudes towards blacks which, as we have seen, 
is a very important factor in shaping white reactions. The 
Mafikeng study is moreover not longitudinal, and therefore no 
definite white migration trends can be established. It 
appears however, that there was nowhere near as great an 
exodus of whites from Mafikeng after incorporation as there 
was from Port St Johns.
Inevitably each town had its own peculiar circumstances which 
had a bearing on white reactions. Comparative information on 
both towns is not available, but certain clues as to why 
whites reacted as they did might be obtained by drawing
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comparisons between population composition, property ownership, 
images of black rulérs, and the economic viability of the towns 
concerned. There is however, one important factor which 
distinguishes Port St Johns and that is it is the only white town 
whose residents had been told consistently over a number of 
years that it would "never" fall under the control of á black 
government.
The following figures relating to the white populations of Port 
St Johns and Mafikeng are of interest. ;
- 40 percent of the Port St Johns population was composed 
of pensioners compared with 11 percent in Mafikeng:
- 90 percent of the people in Port St Johns were property 
owners compared with 50 percent in Mafikeng.
It appears that the Mafikeng population declined only slightly 
after incorporation as compared with the Port St Johns 
population which declined to about 12 percent of its original 
size. It is likely therefore that pensioners and property 
owners react in different ways to groups with different 
occupational and residential interests.
Although there are no findings on attitudes among whites as 
regards Bophuthatswana and related issues, it would appear from 
heresay evidence that the whites of Mafikeng regarded the 
leadership of the already independent state of Boputhatswana in 
a far more positive light than was the case in the Transkei or 
Ciskei. According to the Quail Commission Report (60) in which 
attitudes among a sample of whites in small towns in the 
eastern Cape in 1979 were analysed, some 74 percent of whites 
believed that black leaders in the Tfanskei and Ciskei (another 
"independent nation state" south of the Transkei) were 
unpredictable and could harm white interests. White 
perspectives of black rulers is a significant factor in théir
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reactions. This finding is likely to be applicable also to the 
whites of Port St Johns, who in 1979 were in the process of 
selling their properties to the "Black Trust". With such an 
unfavourable attitude prevailing amongst the whites of Port St 
Johns, the likely reaction would be to distance themselves from 
the town.
Another variable of major importance is the economic viability 
of the two towns. Port St Johns was not a boom town like 
Mafikeng. The economy of Port St Johns relied heavily upon 
tourism, and the district had limited farming potentialand no 
light industry. In comparison, Mafikeng had booming commercial, 
farming and light industrial sectors. It is fairly obvious that 
people will move to areas of great economic activity, or remain 
in areas of economic activity despite political changes.
At the time of the incorporation of Port St Johns into the 
Transkei, The South African government seems to have been far 
more doctrinaire in its attitude to mixed residential areas 
than in more recent times. In terms of strict National Party 
ideology, as applied in Port St Johns the aim was to separate 
whites from blacks, and also not to allow a situation in which 
blacks ruled over a substantial group of whites. In the case of 
Bophuthatswana, however, this ideology was softened. In a 
statement issued by the two governments concerned prior to the 
incorporation of Mafikeng, certain provisions were made for 
white rights after incorporation. For example, white Municipal 
Officials were given the choice of either becoming, seconded 
officials of the South African government or becoming 
Bophuthatswanan municipal officials receiving the same benefits 
as the seconded officials. This statement moreover said that 
"the population of Mafikeng is urged to remain there, and there 
are no signs of a general intention to leave, but there will be 
no direct or indirect pressure upon them to remain. An 
undertaking is therefore given that properties will be bought 
by the RSA if the owner cannot find a buyer in the free market
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at a reasonable price. Market value is determined according to 
current prices of comparable properties, also in surrounding
towns, and it will not be fixed higher or lower by reason of
.. 6 1) incorporation".
The approach to the incorporation of Mafikeng by the South 
African government was therefore quite different to that in the 
case of Port St Johns. The element of uncertainty and the 
alienation from both governments which prevailed in Port St 
Johns, was never allowed to arise in the case of Mafikeng. 
There was little incentive for whites to sell their properties 
in Mafikeng as they would be purchased at market value and not 
above market value as was the case in Port St Johns. The 
reassurances provided in Mafikeng went a long way to explaining 
the differences in white migration trends between Port St Johns 
and Mafikeng, and also suggest how the Port St Johns 
incorporation issue might have been handled differently with 
ultimately greater benefits to race relations.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
The announcement of the incorporation of Port St Johns into the 
black-ruled and soon to be independent Transkei came as a shock 
to the whites of Port St Johns, since it came after several 
convincing South African government assurances to the contrary. 
The initial reactions to the announcement were characterised by 
a great deal of emotion in the community rather than a rational 
assessment of the situation and of their interests. There was 
also a great degree of cohesion amongst the whites of the town. 
The initial announcement and the various protests surround - 
ing the incorporation issue tended, therefore, to bring unlike 
people temporarily together. The white community as a whole 
felt betrayed.
As the emotionalism surrounding the incorporation issue began 
to subside, so did the cohesion within the community begin to 
diminish. People began to take more of a rational-materialist 
view of the situation. The issues of property, material 
security and of security of living became more important to the 
people who eventually left Port St Johns. As time went by the 
issues of material interests and security in general became 
dominant considerations in people's decisions to léave the 
town. Given the high prices which the South African government 
was prepared to pay for properties, and the failure of the 
Transkei government to offer concrete guarantees of security of 
tenure to whites, a virtual exodus of the white population was 
unavoidable. The Port St Johns whites departed, virtually 
en-masse.
In the light of the evolution of the policy goal of "separate 
development" and its application to Port St Johns, the South 
African government almost completely realised its ideological 
goals.
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Little official concern was evident about causing an extremely 
traumatic experience for the entire white population. Nor was 
there any consideration of the future of Port St Johns because 
the way the incorporation issue was handled had a debilitating 
effect upon the economic and social conditions in the town. 
Political policy objectives were totally dominant in the entire 
exercise.
The experiences of the coloured population were not quite as 
traumatic as those of the whites. As a result of incorporation 
and Transkeian independence, the coloured people were no longer 
subject to the discriminatory practices which they would have 
experienced if they had moved to a South African city. Further, 
the coloureds did not have the property interests that the 
whites had, and also they could not look to a very secure or 
well defined future in South Africa. They probably would not 
have been much better off in terms of employment or residential 
opportunities in South Africa. As we have indicated a few of 
the younger, better educated members of the coloured community 
did move to South African centres in search of employment
opportunities, but the older people felt that it would be 
better for them to remain in Port St Johns, despite the chronic 
housing and unemployment problems.
The pattern of events in Port St Johns between 1974 and 1982 
make it extremely difficult to draw firm general conclusions as 
regards the dynamics of white and coloured reactions to 
control by a black administration. The field study in 1974
revealed that not all residents had objections to black rule of 
a fundamental kind. A substantial minority were prepared to 
accommodate the change. A group of people existed with racial 
and ideological attitudes which could have inclined them to 
accept and in a few cases perhaps even enjoy the new
dispensation. The factor analysis conducted on the results of 
the 1974 fieldwork indicated that seme whites felt a sympathy for 
and identificaiton with Transkeian blacks, and that this
attitude co-incided with a disinclination to leave the town.
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As the incorporation issue was structured by the South African 
and Transkeian governments, however, virtually all whites found 
it to be in their interests to evacuate the town, including 
many, if not most of those with benign attitudes to black rule. 
In these conditions material interests prevailed over social 
attitudes. In the case of Port St Johns virtually all whites 
left the town. In the case of Mafikeng in Boputhatswana the 
same material and security interests were so structured that 
most whites remained! in the town after incorporation, despite 
the fact that social and racial attitudes of a basic kind were 
most probably more benign than those in Port St Johns.
While material and security interests are clearly dominant, 
there is nevertheless some interplay between these interests 
and racial attitudes. This evidenced by the fact that most of 
the few whites remaining in Port St Johns were sympathetic to 
their black fellow residents and generally evinced attitudes of 
non-racism. In the words of some of the black people 
interviewed, the racists had left Port St Johns, hence the 
social and racial attitudes intervened between the 
rational-material interests and the decision to leave in the 
case of some of the whites. It is notable that the few whites 
of the original community remaining had even more marked fears 
regarding future security than was typical among the whites in 
1974. Hence, although marginal to the behaviour of the majority 
of whites, the attitudes of racial sympathy appeared to be 
quite powerful in influencing decisions among a minority.
One may therefore draw some tentative conclusions from the Port 
St Johns experience as to how people might react in similar 
situations. It seems clear that material interests and 
security of living arrangements are the most important issues 
in determining people's behaviour. If certain material 
interests like property ownership, employment and income 
security are guaranteed, then people may be prepared to 
subordinate racial prejudices to these interests, as could have
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occurred in Mafikeng. Where these interests are not guaranteed, 
as in the case of Port St Johns, negative racial attitudes, 
material and security concerns combine to provide a massive 
impetus to avoid a situation in which the "status quo" changes. 
Non-racialism and black-white empathy may survive only at the 
margin as it were, among minorities of people who do not 
conform to the general trend. Much depends, of course, on how 
the change in the political and administrative dispensation 
takes place. Long time lags between statements of policy, and 
periods of silence and indecision on the part of the 
authorities involved in the decision-making processes do not 
facilitate the most beneficial outcome. If clear declarations 
had been issued in the case of Port St Johns as was the case 
with Mafikeng concerning property rights, economic rights and 
political rights, then uncertainties and fears about the future 
might be reduced and the Port St Johns white cotmunity would 
have been saved.
If official decision-making provides for the orderly 
replacement of whites by blacks in the public sector and the 
proper training of these replacements, then the unease and 
insecurity amongst whites as regards black administrative 
control might be considerably diminished. In Port St Johns this
type of official programme was clearly needed --- even the
clearly non-racist whites requried this type of assurance.
The case of Port St Johns and its consolidation into the 
Transkei is a perfect example of ideological considerations 
taking precedence over economic and social realities, in so 
doing undermining a potential for development and racial 
harmony. The South African government certainly succeeded in 
"disentangling" the racial intermixture which the situation 
represented. In the process, however, a great deal of 
insecurity, disillusionment and hardship was created for 
whites, coloureds and blacks. The South African government lost 
credibility by breaking clear and repeated promises, and the 
prospects of prosperity for the town as a unique tourist 
resort was set back by many years. We can only hope that these 
mistakes will never be made again.
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